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This paper investigates the relationship between bank concentration and the real 
economy by analyzing the number and average size of firms in manufacturing 
industries in two samples of countries with differing levels of economic 
development. We use a panel of 42 countries and 27 manufacturing industries for 
the period 1993-2001, and we apply the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology. The 
main finding is that in developed countries higher levels of bank concentration are 
associated with lower number of firms, of bigger size, while in developing 
countries this relationship does not seem to be significant. 
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1 Introduction 
The effect of financial system on the real economy has been analyzed since Schumpeter 
(1912). In the 1960s, interest on the subject was renewed by Goldsmith (1969), who 
found a positive correlation between the level of financial development and level of 
economic activity. However, only since the early 1990s a large number of empirical 
studies has found a strong casual relationship (taking advantage of the availability of 
better quality and larger cross-country datasets, and of advances in econometric 
techniques) between developed and more efficient financial markets and economic 
growth. Based on these findings, a growing body of research has focused on the 
mechanisms through which finance affects the real economy, to isolate characteristics 
of financial systems that influences real sector performance and, eventually, future 
economic growth. 1 
A large number of scholars have analyzed the impact of banking market structure on 
the real economy, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. As summarized 
by Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), theories based on the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm would suggest that any situation that does not correspond to 
perfect competition is inefficient and, therefore, would have a negative impact on real 
sectors performance by limiting firms’ access to finance. On the other hand, banks act 
as information producers and thus, under certain circumstances, even in a 
concentrated banking market banks may facilitate access to finance through the 
smoothing of the asymmetric information problems that characterize the lending 
relationship, in particular with more opaque firms. 
The value of a lending relationship depends on the borrowing firm’s future 
performance, which depends on the number of competitors. It is likely that in non-
financial markets incumbents and new firms compete for funding. Therefore, banks 
may influence the market structure of non-financial sectors by choosing to lend to 
incumbents instead of to new entrants, or the other way round.    
In the light of the above countervailing theoretical hypotheses, on one hand, it can be 
predicted that in a concentrated banking market, banks have lower incentive to finance 
new entrants and prefer to support the profitability of their older clients.2 Thus, one 
would expect to find industries with lower number of active firms and bigger average 
firm size. On the other hand, other hypotheses support the idea that market power 
allows banks to establish long-term valuable relationship with their clients, to acquire 
better information on them and to sustain the cost of screening and established long-
                                                           
1 We refer to this literature as finance and growth literature. To sum, there is substantial agreement on the 
positive and causal effect of financial system development on real economy performance. See, among 
others, King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine and Zervos (1998), La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine et al. (2000), and Beck, Levine, and Loayza 
(2000). See Levine (2005), Eschenbach (2004), Papaioannou (2007) for extensive reviews of the literature, 
focusing on different estimation approaches and levels of aggregation of data. 
2 See Cestone and White (2004) for theoretical contributions on this specific point. 
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term relationships even with young and unknown (i.e. more risky) entrepreneurs 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995). If this is possible only when banks have the expectation to 
recover the cost of starting a risky relationship (i.e. in non-competitive banking 
markets, see Section 2), it is likely that in a more concentrated banking market banks 
may finance a higher number of entrants. One would thus expect to find industries 
with higher number of active firms and lower average firm size. 
Given these contrasting theoretical perspectives, the impact of banking concentration 
on the market structure of manufacturing industries is mainly reduced to an empirical 
question. 
This study follows Cetorelli (2004), who focuses on a sample of EU countries, and 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), who analyze US local markets. They find that banking 
concentration is significantly associated with lower number of firms and bigger 
average firm size in non-financial sectors.   
We test whether there is a relationship between bank concentration and the market 
structure of manufacturing industries and, in particular, whether this relationship 
holds in countries with different level of economic development. The main questions 
addressed in this paper are thus: Does bank concentration have an impact on the 
number and average size of firms in manufacturing industries? Does bank 
concentration have the same impact on the structure of manufacturing industries at 
any level of economic development? 
Financial system characteristics have differential impacts on industries (each having 
different technological needs and external finance dependence) and countries. Every 
country has different legal and regulatory frameworks that protect investors and 
banks’ market power, or different levels of information technology, economic and 
political stability as well as technological development, which imply different 
strategies for the lending relationship. At the same time, differences in the with-in-
industry structure of real sectors imply different paths of capital accumulation and 
innovation.3  
For these reasons, it is important to analyze the relationship between bank 
concentration and the with-in-industry structure and to disentangle the effects across 
different industries and groups of countries. We follow the methodology introduced 
by Rajan-Zingales (1998) in the literature on finance and growth. By interacting an 
industry specific measure of external finance dependence with a country’s measure of 
bank concentration, we can differentiate the effects across industries and countries.  
Using data for 42 countries over the period 1993-2001, we investigate whether the 
relationship between bank concentration and the market structure of manufacturing 
sector is non-linear across different levels of economic development. 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Cooley and Quadrini (2001) for a model of firm size dynamics with financial frictions 
and the literature therein. 
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The empirical results show that in high income countries higher levels of bank 
concentration are negatively associated with the number of manufacturing firms and 
positively associated with the average size of firms. By contrast, we find that in 
developing countries higher levels of bank concentration do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the market structure of manufacturing industries.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical 
literature on the impact of bank concentration on the real sector, and reports the 
empirical evidence supporting the contrasting propositions in the literature so far. 
Section 3 illustrates the data and the variables construction. Section 4 describes the 
methodology we used in this analysis, and Section 5 presents the model specification. 
Section 6 comments on the benchmark results, with robustness checks conducted in 
section 7. The last section concludes. 
 
2 Real Effects of Bank Concentration: Theoretical Background and Review of 
the Literature 
Early works in this area focuses on economic history and refer to early industrial 
period. During the early stages of industrialization some of the nowadays leading 
industrial countries were characterized by highly concentrated banking markets. 
Examples of this relationship are found for France and Germany (Gerschenkron, 1965), 
Italy (Cohen, 1967), United States (Sylla, 1969), and Japan (Mayer, 1990). 
More recent theoretical and empirical contributions provide contradictory evidence, 
with mixed findings that can be used to support two opposite views. 
Following a standard approach based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, 
one would support the idea that any deviation from perfect competition will result in 
lower supply and higher prices. In other words, in a non-competitive market, banks 
take advantage of their market power to make profits by extracting higher rents from 
entrepreneurs (higher interest rates) and at the same time they offer an amount of 
credit that is lower than in a competitive market. 
However, other hypotheses pay more attention to the role played by asymmetric 
information problems in the relationship between lenders and borrowers. Petersen and 
Rajan (1995) show that young and unknown entrepreneurs (i.e., without any 
borrowing record) receive more credit in concentrated banking markets. They show 
that in a non-competitive environment, during the first period of the lending 
relationship (i.e., during the start-up process of the firm) a bank can claim lower 
interest rates. The bank maximizes an inter-temporal utility function; at early stages of 
the entrepreneurial activity a bank can lend at lower prices since it is confident that its 
market power will build a long term relationship with entrepreneurs (that can incur in 
hold up problems) and, then, it extracts higher prices in the future. By contrast, in high 
competitive markets banks can experience free-riding problems. In the first period of 
the lending relationship, a bank faces the costs to screen entrepreneurs and risks not to 
get these costs repaid. At the beginning of the second period of the lending relationship 
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(i.e., when the entrepreneur repays the first debt and still needs more credit), the 
entrepreneur might ask for credit from another bank that charges lower interest rates, 
since the second bank has not sustained the initial screening costs. This free-riding 
behavior can result in a barrier to access to credit to young, but good, projects, 
resulting in a decline in credit supply to potentially successful entrepreneurial 
activities. 
Using a similar framework to understand the possible positive role of bank 
concentration on real economy performance, Cetorelli (1997) formalizes two general 
equilibrium models for capital accumulation in two extreme cases of perfect 
competition and monopoly in the banking market. He shows that under perfect 
competition the free-riding problem underlined in Petersen and Rajan (1995) can lead 
to banks abstaining from screening procedures. The cost of screening may prevent 
banks to screen entrepreneurs, in which case banks can only use risk diversification 
strategies to maximize their profits. In this scenario, banks finance a maximum number 
of projects, which would include a proportion of “bad” projects. The presence of an 
unscreened proportion of unsuccessful projects would have a negative effect on the 
economy, while beneficial effects may come from no rent extraction by competitive 
banks. In the monopolistic banking market the bank would resort the screening 
process and would finance (at the extreme) only good projects. The economy as a 
whole would benefit from firms being screened by the bank but, at the same time, 
bank’s monopolistic profits would have a negative effect on the economy. 
Cetorelli (1997) shows that the beneficial effects of the monopolistic regimes prevail 
only if there is a low proportion of good projects in the economy and the available 
technology allows low-cost screening. He suggests that in developing countries the 
proportion of more risky and opaque entrepreneurs is much larger than in developed 
economies, given the lower quality of productive capital, knowledge, experience, and 
infrastructure. Thus, if we associate these conditions with low income countries, bank 
concentration might not be a detrimental for those economies. However, the cost of 
screening may be relatively higher in developing countries, thus any beneficial effect of 
bank market power may be nullified.  
Both contending hypotheses concerning the effect of bank concentration on the real 
economy are supported by empirical evidence.4 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) observe a fall in loan prices following US branching 
deregulation. Black and Strahan (2002), analyzing the US banking markets, find higher 
rates of incorporation after branching and interstate banking liberalization. Beck et. al 
(2004) look at a sample of 74 countries using firm level data, and find that bank 
concentration is associated with higher barrier to access to finance, especially in 
                                                           
4 A third alternative view focuses on the importance of the economies of scale, scope, and product in the 
banking sector. Greater bank concentration would allow the exploitation of increasing returns. However, 
the empirical evidence is contradictory and does not show sound evidence on cost efficiency by exploiting 
economies of scale and scope from consolidation processes. See, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) for a 
review of the empirical works on this point. 
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countries with low levels of institutional development.  Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) 
focus on the effects of competition in US local banking markets on the structure of non-
financial sectors. They find that more competition in the US banking market affects the 
size and the number of firms (i.e. it reduces the typical size and increases the number 
of small and medium firms). 
Trying to provide evidence about the dominance of the information-based hypothesis, 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that younger firms (which are assumed to be more 
credit constrained) receive more credit in concentrated rather than more competitive 
banking markets. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that bank concentration is 
beneficial for the growth of sectors more dependent on external finance; however, they 
find that concentration is overall detrimental for growth. Bonaccorsi di Patti e 
Dell’Ariccia (2001) consider the role played by information in the lender-borrower 
relationship to be crucial. They look at the Italian local banking markets and find a 
non-monotonic relationship between banks’ market power and firm creation, within a 
range where banking market concentration is beneficial. They also argue that more 
opaque firms (i.e., firms that have a low proportion of physical capital) would benefit 
from concentrated banking sector. 
In the following section, we will rely on an updated dataset to disentangle the effects of 
bank concentration on the structure of manufacturing sectors by looking at countries at 
different levels of economic development. 
 
3 Dataset 
The economic literature offers some cross-country datasets that could have been used 
to investigate the particular question of this paper. For example, Cetorelli and Gambera 
(2001) and Deidda and Fattouh (2005) use the popular Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
dataset augmented with indicators of banking market concentration and efficiency. The 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) dataset contains a set of industrial sector variables5  that 
come from the UNIDO (United Nation Industrial Development Organization) database 
for 36 manufacturing industries of 41 countries. However, the industrial variables (i.e. 
value added, number of establishments, and average establishments size) taken from 
the Rajan-Zingales (1998) dataset refers to the period 1980-1990, and there are no 
available data regarding banking market concentration for years prior to 1989. Merging 
variables related to different periods might be a source of identification problems, 
therefore we do not use the data from Rajan and Zingales (1998) like Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) and Deidda and Fattouh (2005) have done. We believe this is an 
improvement respect to the previous literature. 
Moreover, our study aims to extend the analysis to a more recent period (1993-2001) 
and to use annual data, since starting from the first half of the 1990s, many countries 
have experienced bank deregulation and competition reforms that have significantly 
                                                           
5 In addition it contains an indicators of industries’ external financial dependence and other country level 
financial, economic and regulatory variables. 
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changed the level of bank concentration. Using cross-country and cross-industry 
annual data has some costs, in that the UNIDO database is characterized by a 
consistent number of missing or unclean data.6 By applying a conscientious and 
plausible criterion for data cleaning the problems of the UNIDO dataset (especially 
relative to the number of establishments) seem to have been overcome.7 
In this analysis we use data for 27 sectors in 42 countries over nine years (1993-2001).8 
All the industrial sector variables come from the UNIDO database; the two dependent 
variables, that is the industry’s number of establishments (No. Est.) and average 
establishments size (Av. Size) - calculated as the ratio between the number of 
employees and the number of establishments for each industry in each country; and 
the industry’s share of value added (Sh) in total manufacturing for each country in 
each year is used as a control variable in all of our estimated specifications. 
It is important to note that it would have been preferable to use the number of firms 
instead of the number of establishment for computing the average size. It may be that 
larger firms have more than one establishment. However, Cetorelli (2001) shows that 
there is a strong and positive correlation between the number of establishments and 
the number of firms. The decision to look at the number of establishments as a proxy 
for the number of firms seems reasonable and is supported by previous studies that 
have faced the same problem (for example, Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Cetorelli, 2001; 
Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan, 
2006). 9 
For the financial system variables we use data from the most recent version (update to 
2006) of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) dataset on financial development and 
structure. From this dataset we use the private credit to GDP ratio (Cr) (widely used in 
the literature as a proxy for the depth of banking market) and an indicator of bank 
concentration (Conc) that is calculated as the share of the three largest banks on the 
total assets of all commercial banks (i.e. C3 ratio).10 
                                                           
6 The version used is INDSTAT3 on industrial statistics at the 3-digit level of Revision 2 of the International 
Standard Industrial classification of all economic activities (ISIC) contained in UNIDO INDSTAT32 2006 
CD-Rom. It contains values for number of establishments, employment, wages and salaries, output, value 
added, gross fixed capital formation, number of female employees and production indexes. The values for 
each variables, in each country and industry, covers different years. 
7 The filter used in this analysis has dropped all those observations that have an annual growth rate 
greater than 300% for any of two dependent variables present in this work (i.e. industries’ number of 
establishments and industries’ establishments average size). The UNIDO database, especially for the 
1990s, includes a relatively large number of observations that annually growth disproportionably. In order 
to avoid estimation problems, it seems plausible to apply such a filter. 
8 See Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, at the end of this chapter, for a list of countries and industries and the 
summary statistics of both industrial and financial sectors variables. Data on industries and countries span 
for different periods depending on countries data availability. 
9 In this work we indifferently refer to average establishment size and firm size. 
10 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) calculated this indicator from the Fitch’s BankScope database. 
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Finally, the full sample of countries is split in two sub-samples according to the World 
Bank income classification, on which the model is estimated separately.11 
 
4 Methodology 
The conjecture we test follows Cetorelli (2004) (who analyze EU countries) and 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) (who focus on US local markets). Similarly we use the 
Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology to identify the relationship between bank 
concentration and the structure of manufacturing industries and to take into account 
possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems.  
As Rajan and Zingales (1998) state, industries differ from each other in their 
dependence on sources of external finance which, in turn, depend on industry-specific 
technological factors. The main hypothesis is that a more developed financial system 
would facilitate access to sources of external finance thus, by interacting the financial 
variable of interest (bank concentration, which is a country-time specific variable) with 
an industry specific indicator (the Rajan- Zingales (1998) indicator of the need of 
external sources of finance of a given sector), we can differentiate the effects across 
industries.  
In other words, the identification strategy in this paper is based on the idea that 
whether bank concentration (or other financial variables) has a positive or negative 
effect on real sector performance, then these effects should be more important in 
industry that are relatively more dependent on external finance.  
Given the opposing theoretical views about the role of bank concentration on real 
economy, one might expect that firms in industries more dependent on external 
finance would suffer (or benefit) more in countries with concentrated banking 
markets.12  
Consistent with a large number of studies in the literature on finance and growth, our 
analysis uses this methodology and employs the original indicator of external finance 
dependence calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). This indicator reflects the average 
amount of capital expenditure not financed with internal cash flows for the median 
firm in a given manufacturing industry in the United States during the 1980s. Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) justify the choice of calculating this indicator for US firms by 
                                                           
11 Namely, under our category “high” income countries we include the World Bank’s “OECD high income 
countries” and “non-OECD high income countries” categories. While our category “low” income country 
include the rest of the country income groups. Estimations have been conducted for any country income 
group and the results roughly confirm the ones obtained splitting the sample in only 2 groups. Deidda and 
Fottouh (2005) follows a similar sample splitting. 
12 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use a sample of 36 industries across 41 countries, and consider the sum of 
stock market capitalization and domestic credit over GDP in addition to accounting standards as 
indicators of a country’s financial development. They find that the coefficient on the interaction term 
between the financial development variable and the industry indicator of external finance is positive and 
statistically significant at the one percent level. They argue that firms external finance dependence is a 
channel through which financial system development impacts on real economy. 
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arguing that data on external financing are typically not available and, furthermore, in 
other countries they would reflect differences between supply and demand of credit. 
Calculating this indicator for US firms present in the stock market (which is considered 
the most competitive market) allows us to reduce the potential problems due to supply 
and demand differences present in other countries. Therefore, US firms choose their 
optimal amount of external funding to technological reasons and are not influenced 
(or, at least, less influenced) by credit supply constraints.13 
This methodology offers important advantages for an analysis of the mechanisms 
through which finance influences growth. It helps to avoid problems of 
misspecification or omitted variables, because it takes into account country and 
industry (and here time) fixed effects, in trying to isolate the relation between bank 
concentration and the dependent variable. Furthermore, by including the share of the 
industries on total value added, we control for the relative importance of each sector. 
Finally, the Rajan-Zingales methodology has the crucial advantage of offering a way to 
mitigate the problems related to endogeneity that can characterize the relationship 
between finance and real sector performance. Since the indicator of external financial 
dependence is calculated for US firms, it enters as exogenous in a cross country study 
(where the United States is excluded). 
In this work the industry indicator of external finance (Ext) is drawn from Klingebiel et 
al. (2007) who computed the indicator following the original Rajan-Zingales (1998) 
procedure, but ensures compatibly with an ISIC 3-digit industry aggregation, which 
matches our industry aggregation.14 
 
5 Estimated Equations 
The underlying idea of the specifications is to test whether market structure of banking 
sector has an impact on the structure of the industrial sectors. Following the Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) methodology, we interact the bank concentration variable (Conc) with 
an industry-specific indicator of external finance dependence (Ext) in two different 
models: the first having the number of establishment and the second the average 
establishment size in the manufacturing sectors. The first model is specified as follows: 
 
Ln(No.Estc,i,t)=β0+β1(Shc,i,t)+β2(Concc,t*Exti) + θ1Cc+ θ2Ii+ θ3Tt+εc,i,t    (1) 
                                                           
13 The strongest assumption in the framework of the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology is 
perhaps that industry’s technological needs are assumed to be the same across countries. In 
their original work, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that external finance needs are likely to be 
the same across countries in relative terms (i.e. if compared to the other industries of the same 
country). 
 
14 The indicator refers to the 1980s. We have also tried to employ the indicator constructed by Klingebiel et 
al. (2007) for the period 1980-2000 and we obtain similar results. 
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where the dependent variable is (the natural log of) the number of establishments in 
each sector i for each country c at time t. The independent variables are the share of 
value added of each sector on the total value added of the manufacturing sector (Sh), 
which controls for the relative importance of each sector i for each country c at time t, 
and our crucial variable of interest (Conc*Ext), which is the measure of bank 
concentration (Conc) for each country c at time t interacted with the indicator of 
external financial dependence (Ext) of each sector i. By including country, industry and 
year dummies (C, I, T), we control for fixed effects that might bias the identification of 
our variable of interests. 
Giving the contrasting theoretical hypothesis, if bank concentration is a constraint to 
entry of new firms in highly external finance dependent sectors, we would expect a 
negative sign of the interacted bank concentration parameter; conversely, if bank 
concentration is associated with a higher number of firms, the coefficient of interest 
would be positive and significant.15 
The dependent variable of the second model specification is the average establishment 
size in each sector i for each country c at time t, while the right-hand side is the same 
than the first specification. 
  
Ln(Av.Sizec,i,t)=β0+β1(Shc,i,t)+β2(Concc,t*Exti) + θ1Cc+ θ2Ii+ θ3Tt+εc,i,t    (2) 
 
Here, the hypothesis tested is that if bank concentration is a barrier to access to finance, 
then this barrier would be larger for new and smaller firms, so we would expect a 
higher average firm size, especially, in those sectors that rely more on sources of 
external finance. 
  
6 Estimation Results 
Two tests are used to assess differences across the two groups of countries. The Wald 
test that tests the null hypothesis of equality between the two interacted bank 
concentration coefficients of the two groups of countries. The Chow test that assess the 
null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients of all the independent variables 
(except country dummies) of the two groups of countries.16 We show the results of 
these tests any time we change the model specification (Tables 6, 9, 10a, and 10b). 
Results of the Chow tests reject the null hypothesis of equality of all the coefficients for 
                                                           
15 It should be noted that in this specification the direct effect of bank concentration is not identified 
because it is fully absorbed by country and year dummies variables, similarly to the direct effect of 
external finance dependence, which is absorbed by the industries dummies since it would be fully 
absorbed by country and years dummies. This specification allows us to capture second order effects of 
bank concentration on different industries. 
16 See for example Wooldridge (2001) pages 237-240. 
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any model specification. They confirm that we should separately estimate our model 
for the two sub-samples and that there is a different relationship between bank 
concentration and number of establishments or average establishment size for the two 
country groups with differing income levels. Results of Wald tests also reject the 
equality between the bank concentration coefficients in the two groups of countries.   
Estimation results using OLS show a negative and significant coefficient for the bank 
concentration term (interacted with the indicator of external finance dependence) in the 
sub-sample of high-income countries when the dependent variable is the (log of) 
number of establishments (Table 6 column 3). By contrast, the bank concentration 
interaction coefficient is not statistically significant for low income countries (Table 6 
column 2).  
Table 6 columns 4-6 show the OLS estimation results of our analysis using the other 
dependent variable, the (log of) average firm size. As in the previous regressions, the 
coefficients of the interacted bank concentration variable display statistically significant 
and positive effects in the sub-sample of high income countries only. In low income 
countries, the coefficient relative to bank concentration significant and negative. 
In order to give a clearer idea of the magnitude and economic significance of the 
interaction terms’ coefficients, Rajan and Zingales (1998), and other empirical works 
using this methodology, suggest to illustrate a simple example. 
Firstly, recall that the estimated models are semi-log models, where the dependent 
variable is expressed as natural logarithm of number of establishments and average 
establishments size and the bank concentration interacted term is linear. 
Secondly, in the benchmark model of our analysis (Table 6), the coefficients of the 
interaction terms for the high-income countries sub-sample estimations are roughly -
2.5 and +0.5 for the models with (the natural log of) the number of establishments (No. 
Est) and (the natural log of) the average establishments size (Av. Size), respectively, as 
dependent variables.  
Lastly, consider that the industry at the 75th percentile of financial dependence was 
located in a context (country and year) at the 75th percentile of bank concentration, 
rather than in a context at the 25th percentile of bank concentration. And finally, 
consider the same switch of context for the industry at the 25th percentile of financial 
dependence.17 
In our example these changes lead to a decrease in (the log of) the number of 
establishments by -0.225 and an increase in (the log of) average establishments size by 
0.045. Considering that the average values for all industries, countries and years in 
                                                           
17 Mathematically, our example means: Coeff *(Ext75*(Conc75-Conc25)-Ext25*(Conc75-Conc25) or 
Coeff*(Conc75-Conc25)*(Ext75-Ext25), where Coeff is the estimated coefficient, Ext75 and Ext25 are the 
values of the external finance dependence variable at the 75th and 25th  percentile of its distribution, 
respectively, while Conc75 and Conc25 are the values of the bank concentration variable at the 75th and 
25th percentile of its country-year distribution, respectively. Substituting the values of our examples: -
2.5*(0.90-0.65)*(0.4-0.04)= -0.225 
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high-income countries are 5.9 and 3.3 for (the log of) the number of establishments and 
(the log of) the average establishments size, respectively, the effects of bank 
concentration are quite important.  
The fact that bank concentration may enhance industrial sector concentration has not 
received much attention in the economic literature, but is at the origin of possible 
endogeneity problems that might be affecting the analysis. In some countries there 
might be a concentration of economic power (ownership) in the hands of small groups 
that have interests in industrial sectors but that also control banks (or vice versa). This 
reverse mechanism problem as well as the fact that bank concentration might adjust to 
best fit the industrial characteristics of a country are the two main sources of possible 
endogeneity. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) argue that bank concentration typically 
does not adjust to other industry characteristics but is determined by other 
independent factors (i.e. government policy during severe financial repression). 
Furthermore, the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology should mitigate endogeneity 
problems through the interaction of the suspected endogenous variable (bank 
concentration) with an exogenous industry-specific index of external finance 
dependence. However a more accurate investigation of endogeneity is warranted. 
The literature offers some variables that can be used to instrument bank concentration 
in models that have proxies of the structure of industrial sectors as dependent 
variables. For example country legal origin variables which reflect different rules and 
regulation that can determine market structure;18 or, an indicator of the regulatory 
restrictions on banks’ activities in non-financial markets.19  
However, the data used in this work have also a time dimension. This is a source of 
problems to find good instruments with a time dimension, potentially related to the 
institutional and regulatory framework.20 
We therefore decide to use the 5-year lagged values of bank concentration in order to 
ensure exogeneity of the instruments and exploit the time dimension of our data.21   
                                                           
18 La Porta et al. (1998) show that the origin of a country legal system can be a good instrument of financial 
development, since finance operates through contracts. A country can have a British, German, French, or 
Scandinavian legal system and this reflects differing levels of protection of creditor rights and the 
associated enforceability. The correlation of the legal system with financial development is conceptually 
straightforward: better laws (which protect and enforce investors’ rights) create a better environment for 
financial market development. In most countries legal systems are imported from foreign experiences or 
were imposed during colonization; so there are strong arguments to consider this variable as exogenous. 
See also Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2005) for a work about the links between country legal system and 
firms’ access to finance. They find that the adaptability of a legal system is more important in explaining 
firms obstacles to access to finance than the than the political independence of the judiciary. 
19 It may be the case that in highly concentrated banking markets, banks have strong political power and 
may influence the regulation. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) find that bank concentration is negatively 
associated with restrictiveness on bank activities. 
20 Only for more recent periods is possible to find good instruments for bank concetration with time 
dimension. 
21 Also this choice has the cost of losing some observation observations since the data series for bank 
concentration is not complete.  
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In Table 7 we show the statistics of the endogeneity test that tests the null hypothesis 
that the suspected endogenous regressor (bank concentration) can actually be treated 
as exogenous.22 We report OLS estimation results when the test does not reject the null 
hypothesis. The estimation results confirm that in high income countries higher bank 
concentration is associated with lower number of firms and bigger average firm size. 
While, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between bank 
concentration and number of firm and average firm size in low income countries. 23 
Combining the results, we find support for the idea that, even after controlling for 
country, industries, and year fixed effects as well as for the industries relative 
importance in the country, a more concentrated banking market is associated with a 
lower number of establishments and a bigger average establishment size in industries 
that are more dependent on external finance. We find this relationship for the group of 
high income countries, while we do not find a significant (or stable) relationship in the 
group of low income countries. 
This suggests that bank concentration has not in itself a determinant effect on the non-
financial market structure, but it seems to have different effects for different levels of 
economic development. The level of economic development, which is likely to be 
associated with the economy’s institutional, regulatory and overall macroeconomic 
framework, might have an important role while defining the relationship between 
bank concentration and the structure of manufacturing sectors.  
High income countries have more developed financial and legal systems that may 
provide better information sharing and creditors rights protection, and more stable 
economic and political  environment.  
Trying to interpret these results in light of the contending hypotheses about the real 
effects of bank concentration,  in high income countries the beneficial effects of bank 
market power, seen in part of the literature as a means to reduce asymmetric 
information problems, may not offset the costs of a non-competitive credit market, 
which is likely to be associated with higher interest rates and lower supply of credit. 
In low income countries there appears to be a non-significant relationship between 
bank concentration and the structure of manufacturing sectors. This may be explained 
by the fact that some institutional, regulatory, technological factors, also beyond the 
financial system, are more important determinants of the market structure of 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
 
                                                           
22 The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of tested 
regressors. It is a version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman robust to various violations of conditional 
homoskedasticity. 
23 One may raise doubts about identification since we are using annual data and we do not use lagged 
independent variables. However, we have tried to include in our model lagged variables. The result show 
similar results. However, we believe that further research is needed on this point. 
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6 Robustness Checks 
6.1 Outliers 
One might argue that the estimation results are driven by the presence of outlying 
values. To ensure the robustness of the previous results, for all the model specifications 
and for both dependent variables, the sample is restricted to the interval within the 5th 
and the 95th percentile of the country-year distribution (calculated for each sub-sample) 
of the bank concentration variable. 
As showed in Table 8, the results obtained dropping the tails of the country-year 
distributions of bank concentration in both income groups confirm our previous 
findings.24  
A further approach to control for outliers is to estimate robust regressions. We estimate 
the two baseline models with iteratively reweighted least squared (IRLS). The 
estimation results in Table 8 show that the main findings are not changed. 
 
6.2 Augmented Model 
In order to check the stability of the bank concentration estimated parameters, we run 
additional regressions (Table 9), augmenting the models with an measure of the depth 
of credit markets (i.e. banking private credit to GDP ratio) variables that might also 
affect the industrial structure. 
This variable can capture the effect of the quantity of credit available in the economy 
and, more generally, it may capture the effects of the legal and regulatory determinants 
of development of private credit.25 
We find that in high-income countries private credit to GDP ratio is positively 
associated with a higher number of establishments, while it has not a statistically 
significant effect on the average establishments size.  
A possible interpretation of this finding does not differ much from the one used for the 
effect of bank concentration. 
In high-income countries, entrants may take advantage from more credit availability 
and enter the market. At the same time, incumbents also take advantage of the higher 
credit availability: however, the more competitive market conditions may lead some of 
them (likely inefficient ones) to leave the market. An improvement in the aggregate 
quantity of available credit is likely to be associated with improvements in the 
institutional and regulatory framework (e.g. better information sharing, creditor rights 
protection, regulation of banks activities, or removal of legal barriers and impediments 
                                                           
24 Recall that because of data problems with the industrial variables from UNIDO, we have used a filter 
that dropped all the observations that have an annual growth rate greater than 300%. Further robustness 
checks with a more restrictive filter (annual growth greater than 100%) confirm the results obtained with 
the less restrictive filter. The estimation results are available upon request. 
25 See for example Djankov et al. (2007). 
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to bank competition). In this framework banks may not have the incentive to hold 
lending relationship with inefficient incumbents.  
In low income countries, the private credit does not seem to have a significant effect on 
the number of establishments, while it appears to be positively associated with average 
establishment size. It is possible that some incumbent firms take advantage of more 
credit availability and expand their business, while smaller firms and new entrants 
may be constrained by other important barriers to entry and business expansion. 
 
6.3 Country and industry trends 
To control for country and industry specific annual shocks we estimate different 
models that includes country trend dummies (a dummy for each country in each year, 
Table 10a) and industry and country trend dummies (a dummy for each industry in 
each year and for each country in each year, Table 10b).26 
This choice is costly in terms of the loss of degrees of freedom, but it allows improving 
controls for country or industry specific annual shocks. One may argue that the model 
does not fully control for other factors having the same dimensionality since the main 
independent variable has two dimensions of variability (country and time). The results 
show similar results.27 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this study we analyzed the relationship between bank concentration and the 
structure of manufacturing sectors in two groups of countries with different levels of 
development during the period 1993-2001.  
                                                           
26 In the interest of space and easier reading only estimations for the benchmark models are reported. 
However, all the model specifications have been estimated using these three sets of country and industry 
trends. Furthermore, all of the model specification and all of the three combination of country and 
industry trends were estimated regression dropping the tails (lowest and highest 5 percentiles of the 
country year distribution of the bank concentration variable. The estimation results do not change the 
findings illustrated so far. Results are available upon request. 
27 In order to check the sensitivity of our findings to time variability, it is important to estimate the 
benchmark models as a cross section for each year. Clearly, this choice implies a different number of 
countries for each year, since (as noted above) each country is present for different years in the panel (see 
Table 1). Furthermore, for this reason and for the fact that the dependent variables as well as the indicator 
of bank concentration have important variability during the time period of the analysis, a cross section of 
average values during the entire time period does not seem to be correct. In any case, this analysis broadly 
reaches the same conclusions. The estimation results for the cross section estimates for each year are 
consistent with the panel estimations in 7 out 9 years of the analysis for the benchmark model having as a 
dependent variable the number of establishments. The estimation results are available upon request. It 
should be recalled that the choice of the countries previously used is dictated by data availability; only 
very small countries as Barbados, Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago have been dropped. Furthermore, 
the regression models have been tested for several different samples: for example, looking at those 
countries that have observations for at least for 2, 3 or more years during the period of analysis. The same 
results are confirmed and are available upon request. 
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There are theoretical and empirical studies that support two contrasting views about 
the real effects of bank concentration. On one hand, theories based on the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm suggest that banks with market power may restrict the 
supply of credit to firms, especially for firms willing to enter in the markets, while they 
may have “preferential agreements” with older clients (i.e. incumbents). In a 
concentrated banking market, banks have the incentive to lend to incumbents and to 
limit the access to credit to new entrants. This is to limit product market competition 
that may have an effect on the performance of their “older” clients. While in a 
competitive banking market banks may not have the incentive to hold inefficient 
relationship independently from whether the firm is an incumbent or a new firm. The 
prediction support by this strand of the literature is that banking market concentration 
is likely to be associated with lower number of firm and bigger average firm size. 
On the other hand, theories focusing on the “information channel” suggest that banks 
act as information producers and that banks with market power may be able to sustain 
the cost of lending the unknown and risky entrepreneurs if there is an expectation to 
establish profitable long term lending relationships. Here, the prediction is that bank 
market power may be associated with larger number of competitors and smaller 
average firm size in non-financial sectors. 
The results of the present analysis show that a higher level of bank concentration is 
associated with a lower number of firms and with bigger average firm size in those 
manufacturing sectors that rely more on sources of external finance only in high 
income countries. 
These results are consistent with previous studies analyzing this relationship in 
different samples of developed economies. 
We offer an interpretation of our results in the light of the contending views about the 
real effects of bank concentration.  
These findings for high-income countries suggest that the first force may prevail as 
higher bank concentration is associated with industries’ lower number of firms and 
bigger average firm size. Higher level of economic development is likely to be 
associated with better disclosure laws, higher levels of accounting standards, increased 
legal protection of creditors, better law enforcement, information technologies, more 
efficient managements, and less risky economic environments. This framework might 
allow banks to obtain sufficient information and protection in order to efficiently 
allocate their credit.  
The beneficial effect that may be associated with bank market power, through the 
smoothing of asymmetric information problems, may not offset the costs of a non-
competitive credit market, which is likely to be associated with higher interest rates 
and lower supply of credit. 
What seems to be important in high income countries is the availability of credit at 
lower interest rates, which are likely to be offered in less concentrated banking 
markets.  
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In these countries higher levels of bank concentration lead to a scarce dynamism in the 
manufacturing sectors. As found in a large part of the literature, firm size dynamics are 
scale dependent, in the sense that smaller firms tend to grow faster than larger firms, 
and that exit rates decline with the average size of firms in a sector.28   
In low income countries the fact that bank concentration is not  significantly associated 
with the market structure of non-financial sectors might suggest that other forces are 
important determinants and this has different policy implication. 
The World Bank Doing Business indicators shows that in these countries massive 
reforms are needed to lower the barriers to entrepreneurship which may arise from 
aspects besides the access to credit, such as, for example, the improvement of 
infrastructures, protection of investor and property rights, contract enforcement, the 
legal requirements to open and close a business and to trade internationally.  
These countries should focus on the improvement of their regulatory and institutional 
environment and ownership structure rather than on the bank concentration per se, 
which has been for long time at the centre of the policy debate, however might not play 
a primary role on the real economy (Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006).29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
28 See, for example, Cooley and Quadrini (2001) for a model of firm size dynamics with financial frictions 
and the literature therein. 
29 In a recent studies on the determinants of private credit development, Djankov et al. (2007) show that 
information sharing has a positive impact only in low income countries. This finding has a similar policy 
implication, even if he analyzes the problem from a different point of view. In fact, it suggests that reforms 
in this direction should be undertaken by developing countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 The table shows the number of sectors and total observations for countries during the period 1993-2001.  
 
HIGH INCOME 
Country Year  
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Tot. 
Austria 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 
Canada 27 27 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 236 
Cyprus 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 25 208 
Greece 0 23 23 23 23 23 0 0 0 115 
Hong Kong 23 23 23 23 24 0 0 0 0 116 
Iceland 0 0 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 32 
Israel 24 24 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 187 
Japan 0 0 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 189 
Korea, Rep. 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 27 27 242 
Kuwait 0 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 22 169 
Malta 0 0 23 23 0 0 0 0 0 46 
Netherlands 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 24 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 26 
UK 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
Tot. 177 195 254 228 191 167 144 169 171 1,696 
LOW INCOME 
Argentina 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 24 
Bolivia 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 
Botswana 8 8 8 0 0 0 4 4 4 36 
Brazil 17 17 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 
Chile 27 27 27 27 27 27 0 0 0 162 
Colombia 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 0 0 189 
Costa Rica 26 0 0 0 26 25 24 24 24 149 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 50 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 22 22 0 0 0 44 
India 27 27 27 27 27 0 0 0 0 135 
Indonesia 26 26 26 27 0 0 24 24 24 177 
Iran 0 0 0 0 26 26 26 26 26 130 
Jordan 25 24 24 25 25 25 0 0 12 160 
Kenya 20 20 0 20 19 17 19 21 18 154 
Malaysia 0 27 23 27 27 0 0 25 26 155 
Mexico 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Nigeria 14 19 17 20 0 0 0 0 0 70 
Oman 0 18 19 17 19 22 21 23 21 160 
Panama 19 19 0 0 19 18 18 17 0 110 
Philippines 27 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 
Sri Lanka 0 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 208 
Thailand 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
Tunisia 0 20 19 20 17 0 0 0 0 76 
Venezuela 26 27 27 27 24 0 0 0 0 131 
Zimbabwe 25 25 25 24 0 0 0 0 0 99 
Tot. 339 438 382 314 331 259 189 215 206 2,673 
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Table 2 The table shows summary statistics for high-income and low-income countries. No.Est. is number of establishments in 
industry i, country c at time t. Av.Size is the average establishment size in industry i, country c at time t. Sh is the share of sector value 
added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three 
largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. (i.e C3 ratio). Cr is private credit to GDP ratio in country c 
at time t. 
 
Variable Mean sd p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
 HIGH INCOME 
No.Est. 2567.90 6349.15 13 79 400 1909 12557 
Av.Size 50.12 72.92 3.63 15.29 27.68 55.96 189.75 
Sh 0.04 0.042 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.12 
Conc 0.70 0.17 0.46 0.53 0.72 0.87 0.97 
Cr 0.75 0.31 0.30 0.54 0.67 0.91 1.32 
 LOW INCOME 
No.Est. 595.82 1678.30 6 36 118 448 2508 
Av.Size 108.23 130.25 9.9 34.36 65 130.07 358.09 
Sh 0.041 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14 
Conc 0.67 0.19 0.39 0.51 0.65 0.80 0.97 
Cr 0.34 0.22 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.47 0.83 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 The table shows simple average values for high-income and low-income countries over the period 1993-2001 for the financial 
variables used in this analysis. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all 
commercial banks) in country c at year t. (i.e. C3 ratio). Cr is private credit to GDP ratio in country c at time t.. 
 
HIGH INCOME LOW INCOME 
Country  Conc BankCr Country  Conc BankCr 
Austria 0.72 0.90 Argentina 0.43 0.18 
Canada 0.59 0.62 Bangladesh 0.60 0.22 
Cyprus 0.92 0.86 Bolivia 0.68 0.44 
Greece 0.93 0.32 Botswana 0.97 0.14 
Hong Kong 0.79 1.41 Brazil 0.65 0.27 
Iceland 1.00 0.46 Chile 0.56 0.47 
Israel 0.76 0.66 Colombia 0.45 0.17 
Japan 0.47 1.16 Costa Rica 0.77 0.17 
Korea. Rep. 0.48 0.59 Cote d’Ivoire 0.93 0.19 
Kuwait 0.69 0.40 Ecuador 0.48 0.30 
Malta 0.97 0.89 El Salvador 0.96 0.39 
Netherlands 0.91 0.84 India 0.39 0.22 
Norway 0.86 0.68 Indonesia 0.64 0.38 
Spain 0.81 0.90 Iran 0.97 0.18 
UK 0.60 1.10 Jordan 0.88 0.64 
   Kenya 0.62 0.22 
   Malaysia 0.50 0.84 
   Mexico 0.77 0.29 
   Nigeria 0.70 0.11 
   Oman 0.81 0.34 
   Panama 0.42 0.70 
   Philippines 0.88 0.27 
   Sri Lanka 0.74 0.24 
   Thailand 0.60 0.81 
   Tunisia 0.51 0.50 
   Venezuela 0.66 0.10 
   Zimbabwe 0.84 0.20 
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Table 4 The table shows simple average values for high income countries over the period 1993-2001 for the industrial variable used in 
this analysis. No. Est. is the number of establishments in industry i, country c at time t. Av. Size is the average establishment size in 
industry i, country c at time t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Ext is 
the industry indicator of external finance dependence, calculated for 3-digit ISIC industries by Klingebiel et al. (2007) following Rajan-
Zingales (1998). 
 
HIGH INCOME 
ISIC code Industry No.  Est. Av. Size Share Ext 
      
311 Food products 6327.5634 33.95 0.11 0.14 
313 Beverages 458.48 123.28 0.03 0.08 
314 Tobacco 14.55 212.80 0.03 -0.45 
321 Textile 4476.55 27.85 0.04 0.40 
322 Apparel 3757.04 21.77 0.04 0.03 
323 Leather 586.95 16.45 0.00 -0.14 
324 Footwear 602.96 33.18 0.01 -0.08 
331 Wood products 3315.62 17.47 0.02 0.28 
332 Furniture 2066.63 16.50 0.02 0.24 
341 Paper and products 1584.94 52.37 0.03 0.18 
342 Printing and publishing 4699.06 23.78 0.05 0.20 
352 Other chemicals 1017.56 48.67 0.04 0.22 
353 Petroleum refineries 95.14 218.60 0.02 0.04 
354 Petroleum and coal products 255.34 30.41 0.00 0.33 
355 Rubber plastics 523.41 51.00 0.01 0.23 
356 Plastic products 3078.01 34.41 0.03 1.14 
361 Pottery 601.34 23.45 0.01 -0.15 
362 Glass 318.05 36.94 0.01 0.53 
369 Nonmetal products 2628.69 25.03 0.04 0.06 
371 Iron and steel 822.75 93.91 0.03 0.09 
372 Nonferrous metal 711.26 74.24 0.02 0.01 
381 Metal products 8122.44 18.37 0.06 0.24 
382 Machinery 7440.25 50.97 0.06 0.45 
383 Electric machinery 4058.54 52.91 0.10 0.77 
384 Transportation equipment 2211.11 77.56 0.07 0.31 
385 Professional goods 1609.57 37.79 0.03 0.96 
390 Other industries 2226.87 17.44 0.01 0.47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 5 The table shows simple average values for low income countries over the period 1993-2001 for the industrial variable used in 
this analysis. No.  Est. is the number of establishments in industry i, country c at time t. Av. Size is the average establishment size in 
industry i, country c at time t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Ext is 
the industry indicator of external finance dependence, calculated for 3-digit ISIC industries by Klingebiel et al. (2007) following Rajan-
Zingales (1998). 
 
LOW INCOME 
ISIC code Industry No. Est. Av. Size Share Ext 
      
311 Food products 2623.42 72.85 0.18 0.14 
313 Beverages 137.58 141.51 0.07 0.08 
314 Tobacco 847.44 216.19 0.05 -0.45 
321 Textile 1351.20 132.38 0.05 0.40 
322 Apparel 1006.46 112.40 0.05 0.03 
323 Leather 136.52 61.62 0.01 -0.14 
324 Footwear 170.24 141.90 0.01 -0.08 
331 Wood products 648.25 63.07 0.02 0.28 
332 Furniture 598.71 50.99 0.01 0.24 
341 Paper and products 251.13 108.66 0.03 0.18 
342 Printing and publishing 524.95 54.82 0.03 0.20 
352 Other chemicals 516.54 80.27 0.06 0.22 
353 Petroleum refineries 24.68 385.20 0.10 0.04 
354 Petroleum and coal products 69.85 57.86 0.00 0.33 
355 Rubber plastics 298.85 105.10 0.02 0.23 
356 Plastic products 467.88 73.76 0.03 1.14 
361 Pottery 146.82 159.45 0.01 -0.15 
362 Glass 73.13 116.22 0.01 0.53 
369 Nonmetal products 1136.19 60.20 0.06 0.06 
371 Iron and steel 341.65 169.39 0.04 0.09 
372 Nonferrous metal 223.82 138.16 0.03 0.01 
381 Metal products 1179.47 48.76 0.04 0.24 
382 Machinery 843.66 68.50 0.03 0.45 
383 Electric machinery 511.24 141.85 0.05 0.77 
384 Transportation equipment 542.52 111.04 0.05 0.31 
385 Professional goods 130.69 115.14 0.00 0.96 
390 Other industries 261.19 51.28 0.04 0.47 
 
 
Table 6 OLS estimation results for the full sample of 42 countries (FULL) and the two sub-samples of low income (LOW) and high 
income (HIGH) countries. In columns 1-3 the dependent variables is the (natural logarithm of the) number of establishments in industry 
i, country c at year t. In columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment size in industry i, country c 
at year t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank 
concentration (the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of 
external finance dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year 
dummies, respectively. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
7.132*** 5.393*** 9.721*** 2.709*** 2.712*** 4.933*** 
(0.586) (0.540) (0.800) (0.332) (0.425) (0.458) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.837*** -0.252 -2.586*** -0.273 -0.482** 0.480** 
(0.230) (0.271) (0.289) (0.183) (0.242) (0.214) 
Constant 
-0.771** 4.026*** -0.042 5.111*** 4.184*** 6.611*** 
(0.364) (0.308) (0.192) (0.231) (0.229) (0.136) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.845 0.820 0.905 0.706 0.641 0.788 
Wald test  0.000  0.003 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Wald test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Conc*Ext coefficients of the two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
Chow test tests the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients of all the independent variables (except country dummies) of the 
two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
25 
 
Table 7 IV and OLS estimation results. We report OLS estimations when the test does not reject the null hypothesis that the suspect 
endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous. 
Estimation results are reported for the two sub-samples of low income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) countries. In columns 1-2 the 
dependent variable is the (natural logarithm of the) number of establishments in industry i, country c at year t. In columns 3-4 the 
dependent variable is the (natural logarithm of the) average establishment size in industry i, country c at year t. Sh is the share of sector 
value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three 
largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for each 
industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). The 5-year lagged values of bank concentration as instruments for bank 
concentration (Conc). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, respectively.  
 
Column 1 2 3 4 
Dependent Ln (No.Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
Sh 
4.751*** 10.713*** 2.033*** 4.922*** 
(0.630) (0.741) (0.468) (0.539) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.685 -2.680*** -0.458 0.502* 
(0.524) (0.393) (0.426) (0.262) 
Constant 
6.363*** 0.456* 4.344*** 4.449*** 
(0.417) (0.243) (0.343) (0.212) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1172 962 1172 962 
R-squared 0.811 0.918 0.626 0.782 
Endogeneity test  0.119 0.395 0.593 0.415 
F test first stage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² first stage 0.974 0.983 0.974 0.983 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis that the suspected endogenous regressor Conc*Ext can actually be treated as exogenous. P-
values are reported. First stage F-test of exclude instrument. P-value are reported. 
First stage R² reported. 
Note that because of data availability for the series of the 5-year lagged values of bank concentration we lose observations. 
 
 
Table 8 IRLS estimation results (columns 1-4) and OLS estimation results for restricted sample to the within 5th and 95th percentile of 
the bank concentration distributions (columns 5-8) in two sub-samples of low income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) countries. In 
columns 1-2 and 5-6 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) number of establishments in industry i, country c at year t. In 
columns 3-4 and 7-8 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment size in industry i, country c at year t. Sh is 
the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the 
share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external finance 
dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, 
respectively.  
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Estimation IRLS OLS 
Dependent Ln (No.Est.) Ln (Av. Size) Ln (No.Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
Sh 
5.188*** 9.953*** 4.127*** 5.719*** 5.672*** 10.634*** 2.809*** 5.556*** 
(0.271) (0.472) (0.226) (0.338) (0.604) (0.622) (0.479) (0.402) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.144 -2.256*** -0.521*** 0.427** -0.317 -2.737*** -0.195 0.633*** 
(0.216) (0.246) (0.180) (0.176) (0.320) (0.307) (0.261) (0.232) 
Constant 
2.677*** -0.149 4.296*** 6.703*** 1.705*** 7.440*** 4.465*** 4.033*** 
(0.183) (0.172) (0.153) (0.124) (0.265) (0.294) (0.253) (0.201) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2673 1696 2673 1696 2497 1560 2497 1560 
R-squared 0.869 0.927 0.714 0.854 0.816 0.905 0.645 0.782 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 OLS estimation results for augmented models for the full sample of 42 countries (FULL) and the two sub-samples of low 
income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) countries. In columns 1-3 the dependent variables is the (natural log of the) number of 
establishments in industry i, country c at year t. In columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment 
size in industry i, country c at year t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. 
Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at 
year t. Cr is private credit to GDP ratio in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for each industry i, 
defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, respectively. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
6.783*** 5.390*** 9.547*** 2.720*** 2.679*** 4.949*** 
(0.550) (0.541) (0.786) (0.334) (0.419) (0.457) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.756*** -0.236 -2.448*** -0.275 -0.317 0.466** 
(0.229) (0.288) (0.295) (0.183) (0.244) (0.222) 
Cr * Ext 
1.278*** 0.065 0.943*** -0.039 0.689*** -0.090 
(0.135) (0.238) (0.165) (0.113) (0.218) (0.138) 
Constant 5.248*** 4.044*** 0.295 3.511*** 4.377*** 6.579*** 
 (0.262) (0.324) (0.197) (0.199) (0.232) (0.144) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.850 0.820 0.907 0.706 0.643 0.788 
Wald test 1  0.000  0.017 
Wald test 2  0.002  0.003 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Wald 1 test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Conc*Ext coefficients of the two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
Wald 2 test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Cr*Ext coefficients of the two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
Chow test tests the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients of all the independent variables (except country dummies) of the 
two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
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Table 10a-10b OLS estimation results for models including country-year trends (Table 10a) and country-year and industry-year 
trends (Table 10b) for the full sample of 42 countries (FULL) and the two sub-samples of low income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) 
countries. In columns 1-3 the dependent variables is the (natural log of the) number of establishments in industry i, country c at year t. In 
columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment size in industry i, country c at year t. Sh is the share 
of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of 
the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external finance 
dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, 
respectively. 
 
10a 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
7.209*** 5.475*** 9.708*** 9.747*** 2.766*** 2.784*** 
(0.537) (0.499) (0.807) (0.811) (0.318) (0.401) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.911*** -0.325 -2.618*** -2.795*** -0.212 -0.420* 
(0.237) (0.283) (0.293) (0.307) (0.189) (0.255) 
Constant 
-0.868 1.005 -1.228*** 2.415*** 4.264*** 3.248*** 
(0.893) (0.695) (0.251) (0.297) (0.395) (0.466) 
C*Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.849 0.824 0.908 0.713 0.650 0.794 
Wald test   0.000  0.004 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
 
10b 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
7.260*** 5.408*** 9.747*** 2.788*** 2.934*** 4.878*** 
(0.541) (0.509) (0.811) (0.307) (0.388) (0.472) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.912*** -0.374 -2.795*** -0.157 -0.369 0.649*** 
(0.249) (0.311) (0.307) (0.195) (0.265) (0.235) 
Constant 
-1.150 2.147 2.415*** 2.495*** 2.687*** 1.304*** 
(1.161) (1.436) (0.297) (0.515) (0.903) (0.275) 
C*Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I*Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.852 0.834 0.914 0.720 0.669 0.804 
Wald test  0.000  0.004 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Wald test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Cr*Ext coefficients of the two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
Chow test tests the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients of all the independent variables (except country dummies) of the 
two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
